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Evidence. Adams v. Uno Restaurants, Inc., 794 A.2d 489 (R.I.
2002). Expert medical testimony is not necessary to determine
damages for emotional distress when events provide sufficient im-
pact for the jury to conclude the plaintiff has incurred damages.
Whether the firing of an employee is pretextual or not is a matter
of fact for the jury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Gerald K. Adams, had been employed by the de-
fendant restaurant for several years.' On May 20, 1996, while
working in the kitchen, plaintiff noticed foul-smelling backup from
the floor drains.2 After going home complaining of illness, the
plaintiff called the health department to report the problem. 3 A
Department of Health inspector verified the problem and closed
the restaurant for the night.4 Two days later, the plaintiff re-
turned to the restaurant to discuss the incident, but the manager
began a shouting match and accused the plaintiff of stealing a
shirt from the restaurant.5 During the shouting match, the plain-
tiff threatened the manager in front of a number of other employ-
ees.6 Based on company policy, the manager fired the employee
immediately for making the threat.7 The manager called police.,
Upon learning of the charges, the plaintiff voluntarily turned
himself in to face disorderly conduct charges that were filed and
expunged.9 The plaintiff filed suit under the Whistleblowers' Pro-
tection Act, alleging the termination was pretextual for the notifi-
cation to the health department.' 0 At trial, the jury found for the
plaintiff and awarded him $7,500"1 even though he provided no
expert medical testimony of his mental distress. 12 The trial judge
upheld the jury verdict as to liability but set aside the monetary
1. Adams v. Uno Rests., Inc., 794 A.2d 489, 490 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 491.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 492.
SURVEY SECTION
damages after a defendant motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. 13 Both parties appealed. 14
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act, section 28-
50-4(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws, provides "A person who
alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropri-
ate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within three (3)
years after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this
chapter."'1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The general rule is that a plaintiff must offer expert medical
evidence to show the relationship between the alleged harm and
damage. 16 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted this
rule exists because many cases lack objective facts as to damage
and the medical testimony is required to establish those facts.' 7 In
this case, the court concluded that a juror hearing the impact
quantified by the pro se plaintiff could reasonably conclude the
plaintiff suffered the damage alleged.' 8 The court held that be-
cause the plaintiff was able to offer objective facts to support his
claims of damage; including loss of military security clearance and
his difficulties in finding another job, a trial juror could reasonably
conclude that the plaintiff had suffered emotional harm.19 The
trial judge, in evaluating the defendant's motion to set aside the
jury verdict, erred by not considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party (plaintiff).20 Therefore, the deci-
sion to set aside the monetary damages awarded was incorrect.21
However, the trial judge was correct in upholding the jury verdict
as to liability when a reasonable jury could have found the firing
13. Id. at 491.
14. Id.
15. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-4(a) (2002).
16. Adams, 794 A.2d at 492 (citing Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 862-63
(R.I. 1998)).
17. Id. at 493.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 494.
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was pretextual because the allegations of stealing had come from
the discussion about the report to the health department.22
CONCLUSION
The court will uphold a jury verdict when objective evidence
shows an employer used pretextual reasons for firing an employee
who reported an unsafe condition. The court's decision allows
plaintiff to recover damages through objective evidence rather
than complex medical testimony.
Larry D. White
22. Id. at 493.
SURVEY SECTION
Evidence. Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637 (R.I. 2002). For newly
discovered evidence to justify post-conviction relief, the evidence
must be material. Materiality is determined by considering
whether, in the absence of the evidence, the defendant received a
fair trial. A fair trial is defined as one resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence. A full evidentiary hearing must be held before a con-
viction may be vacated.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant Carlton J. Bleau and Mary Todd' played pool at a
Central Falls bar until the early morning hours of January 14,
1988.2 When the bar closed, Mary agreed to give Bleau a ride
home. 3 After following his directions onto unfamiliar streets, Mary
stopped the car.4 Bleau then sexually assaulted her and slashed
her car tires.5 At trial in 1993, Mary testified in detail about the
sexual assault that occurred in her car and positively identified
Bleau as her assailant.6 In addition, Agent Michael Malone, a se-
nior examiner at the Hair and Fibers Unit of the FBI laboratory,
testified that hair found on Mary's clothes and in her car "com-
pletely matched" hair from Bleau's head.7 He also testified that
fibers found on the knife allegedly used in the assault microscopi-
cally matched fiber samples taken from Mary's jeans.8 Agent Ma-
lone testified that "his lab utilizes a 'microspectral monitor' so
sensitive that it can identify a specific dye."9
Bleau was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual as-
sault, one count of second-degree sexual assault, and one count of
malicious destruction of property.10 Bleau was sentenced to two
forty-five-year concurrent terms for the first-degree sexual assault
charges, an additional ten years for the second-degree sexual as-
1. Mary Todd is an alias chosen to protect the privacy of the actual victim.
Bleau v. Wall, 808 A.2d 637, 640 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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sault charge, and a concurrent one-year term for malicious de-
struction of property.1H His convictions were affirmed on appeal. 12
In 1997, a United States Inspector General report suggested
that some FBI laboratory practices were questionable. 13 As a re-
sult, forensic scientist Steve Robertson was hired to review Agent
Malone's findings and testimony in Bleau's case. 14 Though unable
to determine whether all of the FBI laboratory tests were properly
conducted, Robertson did conclude that Agent Malone's testimony
at trial differed dramatically from the FBI laboratory report. 15 Ad-
ditionally, Robertson found that Agent Malone's testimony regard-
ing the fibers from Mary's clothing was misleading and
overstated. 16
Upon learning of Robertson's report, Bleau filed an application
for post-conviction relief.17 The state requested an evidentiary
hearing, but this request was denied.' At the post-conviction re-
lief hearing, both parties presented oral arguments, and various
parts of the reports from Robertson and the Inspector General re-
garding Agent Malone were admitted as exhibits, but no witnesses
testified, no other evidence was admitted, and no findings of fact
were made. 19 Based on these reports, the hearing justice stated
that he "simply could not fathom a jury rendering a verdict of
guilty" and set aside the verdicts and sentences imposed against
Bleau. 20 Afterwards, the state tried to locate the hearing justice to
request a stay of the order setting aside Bleau's convictions and
sentences, but was unsuccessful. 21 The state then sought an emer-
gency stay from the duty justice of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, which was granted. 22 The next morning the hearing justice
denied the state's request for a stay of the order. 23 The hearing
justice informed the state that the indictment would remain open
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 642.
20. Id. at 641.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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and that Bleau would be released if not retried within six
months.24 The state then requested an expedited appeal, which
was granted. 25
BACKGROUND
The standard for analyzing an application for post-conviction
relief based on newly discovered evidence is the same as the stan-
dard used to analyze whether a new trial should be awarded based
on newly discovered evidence.26 This standard consists of a two-
pronged test.27 The first prong is a four-part inquiry, which:
requires that the evidence be (1) newly discovered since trial
(2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due dili-
gence (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching, but rather
material to the issue upon which it is admissible and (4) of
the type which would probably change the verdict at trial.28
The second prong requires the hearing justice to determine
whether the newly discovered evidence is trustworthy enough to
merit relief.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing justice
abused his discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing at
the post-conviction relief hearing.30 The court reasoned that Bleau
had received his constitutionally guaranteed trial by jury, which
had come to a unanimous guilty verdict. 3 1 His conviction had been
appealed and confirmed. 32 The court held that it "[would] not now
allow a conviction to be vacated without first conducting an eviden-
tiary hearing to establish that such a result is warranted." 33
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 642 (citing Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 173 (RI. 2001) (citing
McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1992))).
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting State v. Hazard, 797 A.2d 448, 463-64 (R.I. 2002) (quoting
State v. L'Herueux, 787 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (R.I. 2002))).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The court then reviewed the hearing justice's determination
that the newly discovered evidence of Agent-Malone's -inaccurate
testimony was material and would have changed the verdict.34
The court held that the evidence was immaterial, cumulative, and
impeaching and thus did not justify vacating Bleau's convictions or
sentences. 3
5
The court relied on Kyles v. Whitley for the idea that,
[the] touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable probability" of
a different result .... The question is not whether the defen-
dant would more likely than not have received a different ver-
dict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a different result
is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary sup-
pression "undermines the confidence in the outcome of the
trial."36
In Bleau's case, Agent Malone's testimony only confirmed
Bleau's presence in Mary's car, a fact not in issue.37 The court con-
cluded that "the problem with the hearing justice's conclusion
about materiality is the misconception that an FBI agent's inaccu-
rate testimony always is material."38 In rejecting the trial justice's
finding of materiality, the court held that the inquiry should have
focused on whether a "nexus existed between Malone's conduct and
the outcome of the trial . . . ."39 Here, Agent Malone's testimony
only made it clear that Bleau had been in Mary's car, a fact that
had been testified to by other witnesses and was admitted by de-
fense counsel.40
Furthermore, the court found that the evidence of Malone's in-
accurate testimony served only to impeach Agent Malone's credi-
bility and was cumulative as to Bleau's presence in the car.41 The
new evidence therefore failed the test for post-conviction relief
based on newly discovered evidence. 42 The state's appeal of the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 644.
36. Id. at 643 (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 514 (R.I. 1999) (quoting
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995))).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 644.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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superior court's judgment was sustained and the court remanded
the case with instructions to deny and dismiss Bleau's application
for post-conviction relief.43
CONCLUSION
In order for an application for post-conviction relief to be
granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, that evidence
must meet the same test as newly discovered evidence justifying a
new trial. This standard requires the evidence be material, non-
cumulative and non-impeaching. Where the newly discovered evi-
dence is evidence of an FBI agent's inaccurate testimony, the mate-
riality inquiry must focus on whether a nexus exists between the
agent's conduct at or before trial and the outcome of the trial, cre-
ating the likelihood of a different outcome or undermining the con-
fidence in the verdict. This determination requires a full
evidentiary hearing before a conviction may be vacated on the ba-
sis of the newly discovered evidence.
Carolyn P. Medina
43. Id. at 645.
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Evidence. Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 792 A.2d 50
(R.I. 2002). In order for a tachograph recording to be admissible,-
the-par-tyse-eking-to introduce the recording into evidence must
prove the accuracy of the tachograph. Where authentication of evi-
dence is impossible and the theory of the moving party is that
there has been some destruction of evidence, which has made au-
thentication impossible, the moving party must provide support for
this theory and explicitly state which evidence they believe has
been mishandled in order to be entitled to a jury instruction on the
doctrine of spoliation. Additionally, the rule of the case doctrine
does not prevent a trial justice in a second trial from considering
the admissibility of evidence admitted in a previous trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Elaina Malinowski's fourteen-year-old son was struck and
killed by a tractor-trailer truck driven by Stephen F. Hogan, an
employee of defendant, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS)., Ap-
proximately two years later, Malinowski filed a wrongful death ac-
tion.2 The trial resulted in a verdict for UPS.3 On appeal, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial court had issued
an erroneous jury instruction and granted Malinowski a new
trial.4
In the second trial, Malinowski sought to introduce evidence
regarding the recordings of the truck's tachograph.5 A tachograph
is a recording device, which can be installed in any vehicle, that
tracks the vehicle's movement and speed. 6 In a legal context, they
are commonly used to prove the speed at which a vehicle was trav-
eling at the time of an accident.7 The parties agreed that testi-
mony about the patterns of acceleration and deceleration based on
the tachograph recordings was admissible.8 UPS, however, chal-
lenged the admissibility of the tachograph's record of the actual
1. Malinowski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 792 A.2d 50, 52 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing Karen Smith Cooney, Comment, The Evidentiary Use of Tacho-
graph Charts in Civil Litigation, 92 DICK. L. REv. 483, 483 (1988)).
8. Id.
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speed of the vehicle by filing a motion in limineY UPS argued that
prior to the accident, they had discovered that the tachograph gear
apparatus was defective and, therefore, it could not have accu-
rately recorded the vehicle's speed. 10 However, in the time since
the accident, while the device was in the possession of UPS, the
defective part had been lost or destroyed." In light of the uncer-
tainty regarding the accuracy of the tachograph's speed recording,
the trial justice reserved her ruling on UPS's motion to suppress
the speed recording and suggested that Malinowski might need to
provide expert testimony to show that the missing part was vital to
determining the accuracy of the tachograph. 12 Malinowski at-
tempted to elicit this information from the UPS dispatch supervi-
sor, but he was not qualified as an expert witness.1 3 As a result,
the court excluded evidence of the speed recording based on lack of
adequate foundation and accompanying expert testimony regard-
ing the accuracy of the recording.' 4 The second trial also resulted
in a verdict for the defendants. 15
After the second trial, Malinowski submitted the tachograph
evidence, originally received in 1992, to a second company for anal-
ysis after discovering that UPS had erroneously declared that the
company that had originally analyzed the evidence was no longer
in business.' 6 The new report on the tachograph evidence sug-
gested that the evidence was in such poor condition as to suggest
that someone had tampered with it. 17 In presenting arguments in
support of the motion for a new trial, Malinowski argued that this
was newly discovered evidence that merited a third trial.' 8 The
trial justice denied this request for three reasons.' 9 First, the evi-
dence had not been presented in the proper form.20 Second, had
the plaintiff conducted an independent inquiry, instead of simply
relying on the representations of opposing counsel, the evidence
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 54.
12. Id. at 53.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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could have been discovered earlier. 21 Finally, the "newly discov-
ered" evidence was not material enough to affect the outcome of
the trial, since proving the speed of the truck was not essential to a
determination of negligence. 22
BACKGROUND
The doctrine of spoliation provides that "'the deliberate or neg-
ligent destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may
give rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavora-
ble to that party.'" 23
The doctrine of the law of the case "states that ordinarily, after
a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a
second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same
question in the identical manner should refrain from disturbing
the first ruling."24 This doctrine is a practice that permits "the
court to build to its final judgment by cumulative rulings, with re-
consideration or review postponed until after judgment is
entered."25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in order for evi-
dence of a tachograph's recording of speed to be admissible, a foun-
dation establishing the accuracy of the tachograph recording must
be laid.26 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial justice to exclude the tachograph's
speed recording because there was evidence suggesting that the
tachograph recordings were inaccurate, and the plaintiff did not
put forward a qualified expert to refute this evidence. 27
In light of Malinowski's inability to authenticate the tacho-
graph recording due to the missing part from the tachograph appa-
ratus, Malinowski argued that the trial justice should have issued
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 54 (quoting State v. Barnes, 777 A.2d 140, 145 (R.I. 2001) (quoting
Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000))).
24. Taveira v. Solomon, 528 A.2d 1105, 1107 (R.I. 1987) (quoting Salvadore v.
Major Electric & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353, 355-56 (R.I. 1983)).
25. Id. at 1108 (quoting 1B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 0.404 (1) at 123-24 (2d ed. 1984)).
26. Malinowski, 792 A.2d at 54.
27. Id.
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an instruction to the jury on the doctrine of spoliation. 28 The trial
justice denied this request because Malinowski did not explicitly
identify specific evidence as the subject of her argument, and did
not offer any other evidence in support of her theory of intentional
or negligent destruction of relevant evidence. 29 The trial court
found that Malinowski had only implied that UPS had mishandled
the tachograph with the result that the speed recording could not
be authenticated. 30 This was not sufficient to trigger the trial jus-
tice's obligation to issue the requested instruction.31 The supreme
court stated that "a trial justice is not obligated to issue an instruc-
tion where the requesting party has failed to make clear its argu-
ment or present any evidence in support of its theory."32 The trial
justice's refusal to issue the instruction was therefore not an abuse
of discretion. 33
The tachograph speed recording had been admitted into evi-
dence in the first trial.3 4 Though not an issue raised by either
party, the supreme court noted that the law of the case doctrine did
not prevent the trial justice from considering the admissibility of
the evidence in the second trial.35 The court held that an eviden-
tiary foundation established in a prior trial is not thereby automat-
ically established in subsequent trials.36
Finally, in considering Malinowski's request for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, the court upheld the lower
court's reasoning and denial of a new trial.37
CONCLUSION
In Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that a foundation for accuracy of a tachograph
recording must be laid prior to its admission into evidence. The
court also held that in order to trigger the obligation of a trial jus-
tice to give a jury instruction on the doctrine of spoliation, the re-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 54.
35. Id. at 54 n.4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 57.
2003]
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questing party must clearly make its argument and explicitly
demonstrate the specific evidence to which the doctrine applies.
Additi6nally, the rule of the case doctrine does not prevent consid-
eration of foundation and admissibility of evidence by a justice in a
second trial, even when the evidence was admitted pursuant to a
finding of adequate foundation in a previous trial. Finally, the dis-
covery of new evidence only merits the grant of a new trial if that
evidence is properly presented to the court, could not have been
discovered earlier by reasonable diligence, and is material enough
to affect the outcome of the trial.
Carolyn P. Medina
SURVEY SECTION
Evidence. Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472 (R.I. 2002). When an
expert has testified with some degree of certainty, his testimony is
admissible regardless of his terminology. Where the striking of ev-
idence from the record will obviously prove fatal to a party's case, it
is reversible error for the court to deny a reasonable continuance to
the adversely affected party. A continuing objection may not be
used to strike, from a trial, evidence that has previously been un-
conditionally admitted.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
After an attempt at suicide by overdose, plaintiffs father, Wil-
liam Morra, was admitted to Butler Hospital under the care of the
defendant, Doctor Harrop on May 17, 1993.1 Throughout the ten-
day stay at the hospital, the patient continued to exhibit suicidal
tendencies and was kept under close supervision by order of Doctor
Harrop.2 After a meeting with Mr. Morra's family members on
May 27, 1993, discussing Mr. Morra's discharge scheduled for May
28, 1993 and a positive change in Mr. Morra's attitude, Doctor
Harrop changed his orders by granting Mr. Morra grounds privi-
leges at 2:30 p.m. 3 At 4 p.m. Mr. Morra was declared missing, and
at 7 p.m. May 27, 1993, Mr. Morra's body was found lying face
down in the Seekonk River. 4
The plaintiff sued Doctor Harrop, alleging negligent care and
treatment.5 At trial, plaintiff presented the testimony of Doctor
Sharp as an expert witness in the field of psychiatry. 6 Doctor
Sharp testified that Mr. Morra had died by drowning and that Doc-
tor Harrop was negligent in his care because he deviated from the
standard of care that is commonly practiced by others in the field. 7
The defense contested the issue of causation relative to the way
Mr. Morra died, and at a hearing outside the presence of the jury,
Doctor Sharp testified that it was his opinion the patient had com-
mitted suicide.8 Subsequently, the defendant "was allowed a con-
1. Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 472 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 475.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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tinuing objection to any testimony relating to the manner of
death."9
The trial court admitted Doctor Sharp's statement that the cir-
cumstances led him to conclude that the "only possibility was sui-
cide by drowning" and the testimony became part of the plaintiffs
case-in-chief.10 However, two days later, and pursuant to the
standing objection, the court granted the defendant's motion to
strike all of Doctor Sharp's testimony based on his use of the term
"possibility."" Furthermore, the trial court refused to allow the
surprised plaintiff a continuance to achieve any clarification. 12
The lack of Doctor Sharp's testimony then resulted in a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant. 13
ANALYSIs AND HOLDING
In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court explained that there are no "magic words""
required of an expert, nor are there words that are forbidden.'5 In
medical negligence cases, an expert's testimony is admissible if the
expert has testified with a reasonable amount of certainty.16 Fur-
thermore, the court held that Doctor Sharp's testimony was partic-
ularly adequate because he concluded that suicide was the "only
possibility," not just one of other possibilities. 17 In fact, the court
noted that the doctor expressly excluded any of the other possible
explanations for Mr. Morra's death.' Therefore, the court held
that striking the doctor's testimony in its entirety was an abuse of
discretion. 19
Additionally, the court found that the trial judge's denial of a
continuance compounded the mistake and constituted reversible
error.20 The court explained that the plaintiff had reasonably re-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 476.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 477 (quoting Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 1059, 1066 (R.I. 1998)).
15. Id. (citing Sweet v. Hemingway Transp., Inc., 333 A.2d 411, 415 (R.I.
1975)).
16. Id. (citing State v. Lima, 546 A.2d 770, 773 (R.I. 1988)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 478.
20. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
lied on Doctor Sharp's testimony when it was unconditionally ad-
mitted into evidence and since striking it was fatal to the plaintiffs
case-in-chief, a reasonable continuance was warranted. 21
Finally, the court clarified the use of continuing objections at
trial.22 The court explained that the device is useful in facilitating
more orderly trials and preserving objections for appeal, but it is
misused when applied to strike evidence already admitted at
trial.23
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that expert testimony
is admissible in a medical negligence case if it is based on the ex-
pert's reasonable certainty. Word choice is not important so long
as the expert's certainty is clear to the fact finder. The court also
held that it is reversible error to deny a reasonable continuance
when striking of evidence from the record will obviously prove fatal
to a party's case. Furthermore, a continuing objection may not be
used to strike evidence that has already been unconditionally
admitted.
Johnna Tierney
21. Id.
22. Id. at 478-79.
23. Id.
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Evidence. State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's use of the word
"repressed" and explanations of child witnesses' testimony during
closing argument were proper. The court also held that the trial
justice may allow leading questions to be asked of distraught child
witnesses on direct examination.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant was convicted of five counts of first-degree child
molestation against his former girlfriend's daughter, Jane; one
count of first-degree and one count of second-degree child molesta-
tion against his former girlfriend's son, Henry; and one count of
assault with a dangerous weapon against Henry.1 The crimes took
place between 1987 and 1992.2 The defendant's motion for a new
trial was denied. 3
During the trial, Jane testified that when she was six or seven
years old she saw the defendant's daughter, Ruth, performing fel-
latio on the defendant in the bathroom.4 Jane testified that she
talked to Ruth afterwards and asked Ruth if it happened all the
time, and that Ruth said, "[Oinly when I see my Dad."5 At trial,
Ruth denied ever having sexual contact with her father and ever
having had such a conversation with Jane.6 During closing argu-
ment, the prosecutor explained the inconsistency between Ruth's
and Jane's testimony by arguing that Jane saw the same thing
that had repeatedly happened to her when she was four and five
years old and that Ruth may be repressing her memory. 7 At this
time, defense counsel objected and was overruled.8 The prosecutor
continued by arguing that Ruth may be lying because the defen-
dant is her father.9 The prosecutor argued that the jury had to put
the witnesses' answers in the context of the questions they were
being asked. 10 The prosecutor also explained that a skilled cross-
1. State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881, 882 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 883.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 884.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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examiner will wear a child witness out to the point where the child
witness will say anything to get off the stand." Defense counsel
objected again on the basis that the prosecutor was introducing
facts not in evidence. 12 The trial justice overruled the objection. 13
The defendant also made objections to three leading questions
asked to Henry during the prosecutor's direct examination. 14 The
trial justice overruled all the objections. 15 The prosecutor asked
Henry to describe the alleged sexual molestation.' 6 Henry was re-
luctant and embarrassed to answer the questions.' 7 The prosecu-
tor pressed Henry by asking successively leading questions to force
him to answer.'
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in
overruling his objections to the prosecution's statements during
closing argument.19 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor is given considerable latitude during closing argu-
ments, so long as the statements pertain only to the evidence
presented or reasonable inferences that could be made from that
evidence. 20 The court noted that the prosecutor's explanations of
Jane's, Ruth's and Henry's testimony were within the array of rea-
sonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. 21 The
statements were not totally extraneous to the issues in the case
nor were they intended to inflame the passions of the jury.22 The
statements were the kind intended to rehabilitate the state's wit-
nesses and suggest rationales the jury could use to reconcile the
conflicting testimony.23 The court also noted that although the
word "repressed" has its roots in psychology, the word has made its
way into ordinary usage so that the average juror would under-
11. Id. at 884-85.
12. Id. at 885.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 886.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 887 n.3.
17. Id. at 887.
18. Id. at 887 n.3.
19. Id. at 883.
20. Id. at 885.
21. Id. at 885-86.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 886.
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stand the word.24 The court drew a comparison to the word "de-
pressed," in that the average person knows the meaning of the
word even though it has a clinical definition as well. 25 Thus, the
prosecutor's one-time use of the word did not require an eviden-
tiary foundation.26
The court next turned to the issue of the prosecution's use of
leading questions to elicit the testimony of one of its own wit-
nesses. 27 The court stated that leading questions are those that
suggest the desired answer and that the danger of allowing leading
questions is that the witness will testify according to the answer
the questioner wants rather than from the witness's actual mem-
ory. 28 Although leading questions are generally prohibited on di-
rect examination, they are allowed to guide the testimony of a
hostile or forgetful witness, or an emotionally distraught child wit-
ness that is reluctant to testify.29 The court noted that Henry was
clearly reluctant to testify about events that happened when he
was less than ten-years-old, and that Henry was only sixteen-
years-old at the time of his testimony.30 The court also noted that
the questions the prosecutor chose were not suggestive of the an-
swer, but designed to guide Henry's testimony to the events in
question.3 1 The court concluded that the trial justice had not
abused his discretion in allowing the leading questions. 32
CONCLUSION
Explanations of child witnesses' testimony, during closing ar-
gument, of denials and inconsistent statements made by the child
witnesses may be proper, so long as the inferences made can be
supported by the evidence. Clinical words, such as "repressed,"
that have gained ordinary use do not have to be supported by an
evidentiary foundation before being used in closing argument. The
trial justice may allow leading questions to be asked of distraught
child witnesses on direct examination, so long as the leading ques-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 886-87.
28. Id. at 887.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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tions are designed to guide the witnesses' testimony and not to
suggest the answer.
Joshua A. Stockwell
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Evidence. State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214 (R.I. 2002). In a trial
for assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling with intent to
commit murder, evidence of prior threats is both relevant and ad-
missible to prove malice, premeditation, and motive. Out of court
statements made during, or while still under, the stress of a star-
tling event are admissible under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Although she survived, Amalie Santiago was shot in the head
in her apartment in the early morning hours of May 11, 1993 with
her three children present.' The children's father and defendant
in this case, Julio Torres, was arrested seven years later in Ponce,
Puerto Rico, by United States Marshals from the Federal Fugitive
Task Force, for shooting Santiago.2 The following facts leading up
to the night of the shooting are relevant.
During Spring 1993, Amalie, the defendant's girlfriend at the
time, decided that her relationship with the defendant should
end.3 Shortly thereafter, to the dismay of the defendant, Amalie
began dating Valter Sousa. 4 One day in early May, Torres encoun-
tered Amalie and Valter in the parking lot of a Burger King restau-
rant, where an argument ensued. 5 Valter walked away to avoid
confrontation, but Torres, nonetheless, moved toward Valter. 6
Fearing imminent attack by the defendant, Valter "got in his face"
and pushed the defendant away.7 Torres threatened that Valter
would pay for what he had done.8
Two nights before the shooting, Amalie visited her cousin
Brenda Carrasco, encountering an enraged Torres, who called out
to Brenda, "tell your cousin [Amalie] to tell me the truth. Tell her
if she don't tell me that I'm going to do something big and no one
will ever know. No one's going to be able to get me."9
1. State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1216 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id. at 1219.
3. Id. at 1217.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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Finally, at around 3:30 a.m. on May 11, Amalie's parents, who
lived downstairs, heard a loud noise, entered their daughter's
apartment, and found her in a pool of blood with her five-year-old
daughter standing over her crying.' 0 When asked what had hap-
pened, the child responded, "Daddy did it."" A police officer who
arrived shortly thereafter asked the children what had happened,
and one child responded that she saw her father take a gun and
"kill[ I my mommy[."12
Before his trial for assault with a dangerous weapon in a
dwelling with intent to commit murder, Torres filed several mo-
tions in limine to exclude evidence regarding the defendant's en-
counter with Amalie and Valter at the Burger King restaurant, the
threatening remarks made to Brenda, and the statements the chil-
dren made at the scene of the shooting.13 The trial court denied
the motions, but reserved redetermination of admissibility until
the evidence was offered at trial.1 4 At trial, the judge admitted the
evidence. 15 Torres was convicted; he appealed.' 6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
First, a trial judge may reconsider a prior motion in limine
without committing error per se.' 7 The issue, therefore, is whether
the evidence challenged by Torres was properly admissible at trial
and, if not, whether its admission resulted in sufficient prejudice to
warrant reversal of his conviction.'8 On appeal, however, the re-
viewing court will not second-guess a trial judge's decision as to the
relevancy of evidence unless there is a finding that such a decision
evinces both an abuse of discretion, and prejudice to the rights of
the accused.' 9
As for the prior threats made by the defendant to both Brenda
and Valter, the court held that rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence, excludes prior threats only when they are both
10. Id. at 1218.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1219.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1220.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 136 (R.I. 2002)).
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irrelevant and prejudicial. 20 Absent such a showing, evidence of a
prior threat is admissible because it is relevant to whether the de-
fendant acted with malice or premeditation. 21 Furthermore, al-
though not an essential element, motive is nonetheless probative,
and, therefore, prior threats may be introduced to prove motive so
long as they do not lead to collateral matters or jury speculation. 22
Given that, the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in either initially denying the motion in limine or later
admitting the evidence at trial.23
In regard to the statements made by the children, the court
responded to the defendant's contention that such statements were
impermissible hearsay by referencing the well-established excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.2 4 The court explained
that out of court statements made during the time of a startling
event may be admitted as long as the declarant made the state-
ment as an "instinctive outpouring" and while the declarant "was
still laboring under the stress of [the] experience." 25 Since the de-
cision of whether a particular statement falls within the exception
is within the trial judge's discretion, a reviewing court will not
overturn such a determination unless clearly wrong.26 Here, the
court found the trial judge's decision that the statements, "Daddy
did it," and "he killed my mommy," fell within the excited utter-
ance exception and was not clearly wrong, since the statements
were made only three to five minutes after the shooting.27 There-
fore, the court affirmed their admissibility.28
CONCLUSION
Prior threats made by a defendant accused of attempted mur-
der are admissible at trial if they are both relevant and non-preju-
dicial. Prior threats are relevant to show malice, premeditation,
20. Id. at 1221 (quoting Gomes, 764 A.2d at 136).
21. Id. (citing State v. Bibee, 559 A.2d 618, 620-22 (R.I. 1989) (quoting State v.
Pule, 453 A.2d 1095, 1098 (R.I. 1982))).
22. Id. (citing Bibee, 559 A.2d at 620-22 (quoting Pule, 453 A.2d at 1098)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1222.
25. Id. (quoting State v. Krukue, 726 A.2d 458, 462 (R.I. 1999)).
26. Id. (citing State v. Medina 767 A.2d 655, 658 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Krukue,
726 A.2d at 462)).
27. Id. at 1222-23.
28. Id. at 1223.
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and motive, and are admitted if they neither lead to jury specula-
tion, nor open up collateral matters. Finally, hearsay statements
made while the declarant was laboring under the stress of a star-
tling event are admissible under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule.,
Eric W. Nicastro
